This paper examines the information content of insider trade Form 4 filings under the more timely disclosure regime introduced by Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Abnormal returns and trading volumes around filings of insider purchases are significantly greater after than before SOX. The increase in returns around post-SOX filings of insider purchases is comparable to the amount of news that used to leak prior to pre-SOX filings. In the case of insider sales, abnormal trading volumes around their filings are also greater post-SOX, but stock returns are not more negative. Further analysis identifies two factors contributing to the difference between pre-and post-SOX sale returns: a decrease in insiders' propensity to time their sales shortly ahead of bad news after SOX and the greater dispersion of filings over time compared to before SOX.
Introduction
The Prior research reports mixed evidence in terms of the information content of insider trade filings before SOX (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Aboody and Lev, 2000) .
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By contrast, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns over the two-day window starting on filing dates of director stock purchases (sales) in the U.K., where reporting requirements are such that there is a maximum delay of six business days from the transaction to its public release. 3 My study extends this strand of literature by documenting how a change in insider trade disclosure regulation in the U.S.
has resulted in the provision of more timely and relevant information to market participants.
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1 In most empirical studies, the term "insiders" is employed to designate directors, officers and beneficial owners of more than 10% subject to the filing requirements of Section 16 of the Exchange Act of 1934 prior to August 29, 2002 , and of Section 403 of SOX subsequently. I further restrict my analysis to top management team members, whose trades are most likely to be informed (Gombola et al., 1983; Lin and Howe, 1990; Seyhun, 1998) . 2 This is despite evidence in the prior literature that corporate insider trades are associated with subsequent stock returns, which indicates that insiders trade upon private information not reflected in stock price (e.g. Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) . 3 However, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) report that in 85% of their sample, the delay is only zero or one day. 4 Another particularity of the accelerated filing requirements of Section 403 is that stock option grants are subject to the same regime, whereas they were previously reported on Form 5, not due until 45 days after and/or interpret the signal differently. Using stock returns adjusted for book-to-market and size 5 and abnormal trading volumes as proxies for information content, I find evidence that insider purchase filings are significantly more informative after SOX. Over a three-day window starting on the receipt of the form by the SEC, the mean cumulative abnormal returns are 0.63% and 1.89% pre-and post-SOX, while the average daily trading volumes are 1.22% and 9.09% higher than normal respectively; each of these differences are statistically significant. In the case of insider sales, daily trading volumes around post-SOX filings are significantly higher than normal (about 1.5%) and greater than pre-SOX. By contrast, mean abnormal returns are more negative around pre-than post-SOX filings (-0.27% and -0.11% respectively, over a three-day window).
The results in terms of returns around filings of insider sales do not appear to be consistent with my contention that Section 403 of SOX increases their information the end of the fiscal year. Heron and Lie (2006) use this institutional change to test the backdating hypothesis for option grant date choice. Concurrent working papers by Collins et al. (2005) and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006a,b) also look at the effect of Section 403 of SOX on the patterns of stock returns around option grants (negative before, positive after) documented before SOX (Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) . 5 The expected returns are daily returns on the Fama-French 5x5 portfolios based on market capitalization and book-to-market ratio and obtained from Professor Kenneth French's website. Returns based on sizeand momentum-portfolios as well as market-adjusted returns yield similar results.
content. I argue that the impact of the increased timeliness of Form 4 filings on contemporaneous short-window returns is potentially confounded by two factors.
First, the change in institutional environment and market conditions around the passage of SOX may have reduced the incidence of insider sales driven by private information. Indeed, SOX was enacted two months prior to the end of the correction period of the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, a period during which informed insider stock sales were believed to be rampant by academics and practitioners alike (see Fuller and Jensen, 2002; Greenspan, 2002) . When I compare abnormal returns cumulated from the day following an insider transaction to the filing date of the corresponding Form 4 or a few days afterward, I find that pre-SOX returns after insider sales are significantly more negative than post-SOX. This is consistent with a decrease in insiders' propensity to time their sales shortly ahead of bad news after SOX. This finding does not extend to purchase transactions, as I find no significant difference between pre-and post-SOX mean or median returns starting from transaction dates and ending two days after purchase filings. Hence the increase in stock returns around Form 4 filings of purchases from pre-to post-SOX is comparable to the amount of positive news that used to be impounded into stock price before pre-SOX filings.
Another reason for the lower informativeness of sale filings post-SOX could be that Section 403 resulted in a larger frequency of filings that may convey little information on an individual basis. I assume that the observed tendency of insiders to trade over consecutive days reflects a breakdown of a total pre-decided amount, in order to limit the price impact of their trades (Kyle, 1985) . If insiders keep breaking down their trades into several transactions over a period of several days after SOX, the new reporting rule will result in multiple Form 4s being filed within a few days of each other. This is expected to affect insider sales more than purchases because sales tend to be larger than purchases (Seyhun, 1998) . The data indicates that before and after SOX, about 40% of insider monthly stock sales observations are spread over several trading dates. To estimate the extent to which the dispersion of filings affects short-window returns around post-SOX Form 4 filings of sales, I aggregate them at the firm-month level. In that case, I
find that average three-day returns around pre-SOX filings are no longer more negative than post-SOX, which suggests that the lack of clustering of post-SOX filings partly explains the less negative returns observed around Form 4 filings of sales after SOX.
Finally, I investigate cross-sectional determinants of stock returns and trading volumes around Form 4 filings. I find that the association between trading volumes and pre-filing analyst forecast dispersion increases (decreases) after SOX for purchases (sales). This suggests that the precision of purchase (sale) filings increased (decreased)
after SOX (Karpoff, 1986; Dontoh and Ronen, 1993) . I also find that the information content of purchase filings decreases in the trade reporting lag, a result likely attributable to leakage occurring prior to Form 4 filings. For sales, the significantly negative association between reporting lag and returns around pre-and post-SOX filings suggests that trades reported most diligently are less likely to signal bad news.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 3 delineates the research design. Section 4 describes the sample and presents the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. post information online about the trades the day after they are filed with the SEC.
Hypothesis development
Analytically, Huddart et al. (2001) show that public disclosure of insider trades accelerates price discovery compared to the no-disclosure benchmark model of Kyle (1985) . Empirically, the association between insider trades and future returns documented throughout decades of observed corporate insider trading suggests that the average insider trade is a potential signal to investors about firm value. Insofar as the disclosure does not occur after the news that insiders were trading upon, a Form 4 may have information content, i.e. affect demand and supply for a stock and its equilibrium price. Information content is measured not only in terms of stock returns, but also trading volumes, in conjunction with the information environment around the disclosure, as demonstrated theoretically by Karpoff (1986) , Kim and Verrechia (1991), and Dontoh and Ronen (1993) . Trading volumes can result from differential interpretations of a disclosure among traders, or convergence of their previously dispersed beliefs. The announcement of an insider trade is expected to generate both abnormal stock returns (positive for purchases, negative for sales) and abnormal trading volumes.
Hypothetically, if the same exact insider trade were subject to a more timely disclosure requirement, I would expect its disclosure to trigger a larger price reaction, because some of the private information that insiders trade upon can be revealed before an untimely Form 4 filing. Indeed, before SOX, several studies such as Givoly and Palmon (1985) and Aboody and Lev (2000) document positive (negative) abnormal returns in the days following insider purchases (sales), but before their public filing. Under heterogeneous beliefs, accelerated filing and prompt online public dissemination of Form 4s by firms and the SEC are also expected to affect trading volumes positively because more market participants will trade on the insider signal at the same time.
However, this assumes that insiders trade on their private information to the same extent before and after SOX. I argue that this may not be the case for insider sales. In the wake of corporate scandals contemporaneous to the enactment of SOX, I expect insiders to be less prone to engage into opportunistic trading because of increased scrutiny from investors, medias and regulators (what Huddart, Ke and Shi, 2007, label as "jeopardy").
Since insider sales are more exposed to litigation and prosecution than purchases, I
expect them to be more affected by this change. 6 This is assumed to be the by-product of an asymmetry in expected legal costs associated with good and bad news. In the case of good news, one suffers an opportunity loss rather than an out-of-pocket cost, and is it more difficult to prevail in front of juries with the former (see Skinner, 1994) . The connection with insider trading comes from the fact that insider selling is recognized by courts as a mechanism to establish that the defendants acted with scienter in securities fraud allegations, which plaintiffs ought to prove for their lawsuit to prevail under Rule 10b-5. Hence, plaintiffs resort to insider selling allegations to substantiate many cases. 7 See also Carter, Lynch and Zechman (2006) , who document that after SOX, income-decreasing accruals are associated with a larger penalty, and non-discretionary earnings with greater rewards in terms of bonus compensation.
their stock as they did prior to SOX. 8 More generally, I hypothesize that the average insider sale will be driven by private information to a lesser extent after SOX. In that case, the more negative returns that would have been induced by the more timely disclosure of insider sales can be mitigated by the concurrent decrease in opportunistic selling after SOX.
Second, I expect the new disclosure rule to result in the provision of information about insider trades in a more disaggregated fashion after SOX. Insiders tend to trade several times over a period of several days. I assume that this reflects concerns with the influence on stock price of large trades, which is consistent with Kyle's (1985) strategic model of trading. Hence, large transactions are expected to be divided into multiple transactions over a period of several days. Under the old reporting regime, insiders could wait until the deadline to file a single Form 4, whereas under Section 403 of SOX, the same insider may report several Form 4s within days to meet the two-business-day deadline. I expect sales to be more affected than purchases because they tend to be larger than purchases (Seyhun, 1998) . The probability that an open market insider purchase may be driven by private information is expected to be high, even for small purchases. In addition, assuming that waiting for the deadline was the norm, pre-SOX trades could be reported around the same date for all insiders across all firms. Market participants who use insider trades in their investment decisions are more likely to do so at a certain level of aggregation in the case of sales, which are very noisy when considered individually, among others because of liquidity trades. Before SOX, they could simultaneously receive information about insider trade disclosures at the firm-, industry-and market-level. This is unlikely to occur after SOX, unless all insiders trade at the same time.
Overall, the tension between increased timeliness and 1) the decrease in informed trading, 2) the greater disaggregation of filings is expected to be more severe for sales than purchases. Accordingly, I formulate a directional hypothesis with respect to the effect of Section 403 of SOX on Form 4 filings of insider purchases, but leave sales as an empirical question: 
Information content of insider trade filings: multivariate analysis

Trading volumes
To test PostSOX is an indicator variable equal to one for post-SOX filings, zero otherwise.
Reporting Lag is the number of trading days between an insider transaction and its filing.
If several trades are filed on the same day in a given firm, the reporting lag of the earliest trade prevails. The variable is censored at three days (i.e. late filings) for post-SOX Because of the fundamental differences between purchases and sales, Model (2) is run separately for these two types of transactions. I choose to measure the dependent variable over a five-day window as in Lakonishok and Lee (2001) to allow for delayed reactions to Form 4 filings to be included, especially before SOX when electronic filing was not common practice (Bryan-Low, 2002) . The coefficient on PostSOX is expected to 11 I use trades from all directors and officers to construct this variable.
be significantly positive, especially for purchases, following the hypothesis development.
If leakage 12 affects negatively the information content of pre-SOX Form 4 filings, and leakage increases with filing delays, then the coefficient on Reporting Lag should be negative. Since reporting lags are much shorter after SOX, I interact Reporting Lag with
PostSOX to capture the pre-and post-SOX effect of leakage on Volume separately. Prior analytical work shows that disclosure can trigger trading volume when traders interpret a signal differently or when they interpret it identically but have different priors (Karpoff, 1986; Kim and Verrechia, 1991; Dontoh and Ronen, 1993) . Disclosure that induces convergence is considered to have more information content, whereas noisy signals tend to generate different interpretations. The precision of an insider trade signal is unobservable, but can be inferred from the association between Volume and Dispersion as a proxy for pre-filing belief heterogeneity. 13 In Model (2) Restrict are the same as in Equation (2).
As in (2), I run the model separately for purchases and sales, but also pre-and post-SOX. The latter distinction is equivalent to interacting the PostSOX indicator from Model (2) with all other variables. As in Model (2), Reporting Lag is included to capture the potential effect of leakage on the information content of Form 4 filings as a function of the delay between the transaction and its public disclosure. If leakage increases in reporting lag, then the association will be negative (positive) for purchase (sale) filings. I
include Trade Size to assess if the market reacts more strongly to insider trade filings, the greater those trades are as a percentage of shares outstanding. The other independent variables are also expected to be determinants of returns around insider trade filings, as they proxy for other dimensions of information asymmetry, risk and past performance.
Prior research shows that insiders tend to buy (sell) shares in value (growth) stocks (Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005) . If insider purchases (sales) in high (low) book-to-market firms signal under-(over-) valuation, the coefficient on Book-to-Market should be positive in Model (4). Net insider purchases predict more positive abnormal returns in smaller firms (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001 ), hence the coefficient on Size should be negative (positive) for purchases (sales). 
Results
Sample and descriptive statistics
The data employed for the main tests in this study is gathered from the following This provides additional support to the interpretation from the results in Table 1 in terms of greater dispersion of post-SOX filings. Table 2 leads to 16 To provide a benchmark for the magnitude of this trading activity, the mean abnormal trading volume around earnings announcement according to Model (1) (using all earnings announcements that fall within 50 days of a Form 4 filing) is about 25%, which shows that post-SOX filings of top managers' open market purchases generate a large amount of trading volume.
Information content of Form 4 filings 4.2.1. Insider purchase filings before versus after SOX
the conclusion that the market reacts more quickly and strongly to insider purchase filings after SOX, which supports H1. Table 4 . The number of observations drops by almost 50% for post-SOX filings, whereas it is only marginally affected by the aggregation for pre-SOX filings, which are already clustered. In Panel A, mean and median pre-SOX returns are also unaffected, while post-SOX returns are more negative at the firm-month level than at the individual form level. The difference between mean CAR 0,2 before and after SOX is no longer statistically significant. Panel B reports mean and median Volume at the firmmonth level. Compared to Table 3 , the gap between pre-and post-SOX mean and median
Insider sale filings before versus after SOX
Volume widens. Hence, the results in Table 4 suggest that the more diffuse release of insider sale filings under Section 403 of SOX partly explains why they are not contemporaneous to abnormal returns more negative than pre-SOX when observed at the individual filing level.
Abnormal returns as of transaction dates
The analysis so far ignores stock price patterns between insider transactions and their filings, especially in the pre-SOX period. The next set of results addresses this issue. Table 5 are consistent with the argument that there is less opportunistic insider selling after SOX, as measured by the association between insider sales and subsequent short-term returns. This suggests that, after SOX, disclosures of insider purchases in financially distressed firms signal good news. Overall, for purchases, the multivariate results suggest that the increase in returns around post-SOX filings is due to their greater association with trade and firm characteristics. Finally, in terms of R 2 , there is a large increase from pre-to post-SOX for purchases, but not sales, which provides additional support to the conclusion that Section 403 of SOX increases the information content of insider purchases more than sales.
Determinants of Form 4 filing information content
Trading volumes
Abnormal returns
Additional tests
Returns following sales and litigation risk
To complement the previous tests, I look at the association between short-term returns following insider sales and an estimate of the firm-level ex-ante litigation risk.
The purpose of this test is to shed additional light on the change in opportunistic insider selling behavior around the passage of SOX. In particular, I expect managers in firms with high ex-ante litigation risk to be more cautious in timing their stock sales after SOX.
I run the following regression for insider sales: The results, presented in Table 9 , indicate that there is no significant difference between mean abnormal returns and trading volumes measured over a short-window following Form 4 filings of insider trades before and after December 2, 2001 within the pre-SOX era. Post-SOX filings of purchases remain more informative than pre-and postEnron bankruptcy filings. Likewise, three-and five-day mean daily abnormal trading volumes are significantly greater after SOX compared to either pre-SOX period. Hence, there is no evidence that the increase in information content of (volume reactions to)
Form 4 filings of insider purchases (sales) around SOX is attributable to the events that led to the enactment of SOX.
I also check whether the results hold if I require the same firms to be in the sample before and after SOX. When I keep post-SOX observations for firms that had at least one insider trade before SOX, I find virtually the same results as with the main sample, although there are about 30% fewer post-SOX purchases and sales.
Conclusion
This When returns are accumulated as of the transaction date, the results suggest that the increase in returns around post-SOX filings of purchases corresponds to the amount of good news that used to be incorporated into stock price prior to pre-SOX filings. Also, I
find that volume reactions to post-SOX purchase filings are positively associated with pre-filing analyst forecast dispersion, which is consistent with those filings inducing convergence of beliefs on average (Karpoff, 1986; Dontoh and Ronen, 1993) . 
Variable definitions
Trade Size Number of shares purchased/sold by a senior executive (CEO, CFO, COO, Chairman of the Board, President) as reported on a Form 4, divided by common shares outstanding.
CAR t,t+n
Abnormal stock returns around Form 4 SEC filing date (t=0), adjusted for size and book-to-market using the Fama-French 5x5 portfolios based on market capitalization and book-to-market ratio.
Volume t,t+n
Daily abnormal trading volume around a Form 4 SEC filing date (t=0). It is measured by the coefficient on an indicator variable equal to one for days t to t+n in a firm-specific regression of daily trading volumes on lagged daily trading volumes and market-level trading volumes, as in Meulbroek (1992) , Yermack (1997) , Heron and Lie (2006) .
PostSOX
Indicator variable equal to one for transactions filed under Section 403 of SOX, i.e. which occurred on or after August 29, 2002, zero otherwise.
Reporting Lag
Number of trading days between the first insider trade filed on a Form 4 and the receipt of the Form by the SEC. The variable is censored at three days for post-SOX trades.
High Risk
Indicator variable equal to one if an abnormally large sale* occurs in a firm whose ex-ante litigation risk is in the top quartile of the distribution across all sample firms in the same calendar year, zero otherwise. Litigation risk is calculated using the Rogers and Stocken (2005) model with firm-year observations and calendar year indicator variables. Lagged values are used to obtain an ex-ante measure. *Sales reported on a given date are considered abnormally large if total sales by the reporting insider and by all insiders in the firm over the last 365 days exceed respectively the insider-and firm-level past annual mean (calculated over a maximum of five years) by more than five standard deviations, or by 100% if standard deviation is not available, zero otherwise. Option Exercise Indicator variable equal to one for insider sales filed on the same Form 4 as an option exercise, zero otherwise.
Dispersion
Standard deviation of analyst annual EPS forecasts issued between the latest earnings announcement and a Form 4 filing, scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecast. If an analyst issues multiple forecasts, only the most recent one is taken into account. Analysts forecasts are obtained from I/B/E/S. Size Natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm (Compustat Data61×Data14), as of the end of the most recent fiscal quarter. Book-to-Market Book value of common stockholder equity (Compustat Data59) divided by market value of equity (Compustat Data61×Data14), as of the end of the most recent fiscal quarter.
R&D
Indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported a non-zero R&D expense (Compustat Data46) in the most recent fiscal year, zero otherwise.
Loss
Indicator variable equal to one if net income before extraordinary items (Compustat Data18) for the most recent fiscal year is strictly negative, zero otherwise.
Restrict
Indicator variable equal to one for all filings in a firm-fiscal year if 75% or more of insider trades executed during the year occur in a 30-day window following an earnings announcement. In both panels, ***,**,* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels. † Indicates that a mean or median is insignificantly different from zero at the 0.10 level. In both panels, ***,**,* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels. † indicates that a mean is insignificantly different from zero at the 0.10 level. a occurs in a firm whose ex-ante litigation risk is in the top quartile of the distribution across all sample firms in the same calendar year, zero otherwise. Litigation risk is calculated using the Rogers and Stocken (2005) model, and lagged values are used to form an ex-ante measure. a An insider sale as reported on a Form 4 is considered abnormally large if total sales by the reporting insider and by all insiders in the firm over the last 365 days exceed respectively the insider-and firm-level past annual mean (calculated over a maximum of five years) by more than five standard deviations, or by 100% if standard deviation is not available. Trade Size: number of shares sold (multiplied by 10 in this table) as reported on the Form 4, scaled by shares outstanding. Book-to-market: Quarterly Compustat Data59 / (Data61×Data14), as of the end of the previous fiscal quarter. Size: log (Quarterly Compustat Data61×Data14), as of the end of the previous fiscal quarter. R&D: indicator variable equal to one if Annual Compustat Data46 at the end of the previous fiscal year is strictly positive, zero otherwise. Loss: indicator variable equal to one if Annual Compustat Data18 at the end of the previous fiscal year is strictly negative, zero otherwise. Restrict: indicator variable equal to one for all filings in a firm-fiscal year if 75% or more of insider trades executed during the year occur in a 30-day window following an earnings announcement. T-statistics are in bold font if the corresponding two-tailed p-value is less than 0.10. † Indicates that a mean is insignificantly different from zero at the 0.10 level.
42 Returns are adjusted using Fama-French 5x5 portfolios based on size and book-to-market. Since the window between transactions and their SEC filings is subject to a large degree of variation before SOX, only the first five days after transaction dates and the last five days before filing dates are plotted, hence the discontinuity in the pre-SOX lines. Returns prior to insider transactions are not shown. 
